

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8052

INFO AMEMBASSY TGOYO

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SEOUL 3438

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, KS, KN

SUBJECT: ROK FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

REF: SEOUL 3353

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE EMBASSY'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ROKG'S NEW "TWO KOREAS" POLICY INITIATIVE.

1. CONSIDERING THE RIGIDITY OF PAST ROK POLICY AND THE EFFORT AND INVESTMENT EXPENDED TO MAINTAIN THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION OF THE DPRK, NEW POLICY DESCRIBED REFTEL IS A SIGNIFICANT MAJOR DEPARTURE. IT WAS NOT EASILY REACHED. AND IS THE PRODUCT OF THE KOREAN CAPACITY FOR PRAGMATIC ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL REALITIES.

2. WE SHOULD GIVE THIS ROK POLICY INITIATIVE OUR FULLEST SUPPORT, RECOGNIZING THAT WE AND KOREANS MUST WEIGH CAREFULLY ITS IMPACT ON OUR LONGSTANDING POLICIES AND PATTERNS OF ACTION. WE MUST ALSO ASSESS CAREFULLY WHETHER POLICY INITIATIVE AS IT STANDS IS SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH ROK OBJECTIVES AND OUR OWN, OR WHETHER WE MUST CONSIDER MORE EXTENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING. I BELIEVE THAT TWO MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO FOCUS ON AT THIS STAGE ARE:

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A. NEED TO PROMPTLY ESTABLISH BASIC UNDERSTANDINGS WITH ROKG ON DIRECTION OF NEW POLICY, TACTICS AND TIMING. THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION SHOULD BEGIN SOONEST.

B. NEED TO IDENTIFY THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS WHICH NEED SPECIAL, DETAILED STUDY BECAUSE OF THEIR IMPORTANCE.

3. I SEE THESE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS AS BEING:

A. TACTICS TO HANDLE KOREAN QUESTION IN FORTHCOMING UNGA UNDER RADICALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION NOW OBTAINING.

B. THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE UNC, PARTICULARLY IF THERE ARE TWO KOREAS IN THE UN.

C. THE HANDLING OF UNCRUK AND ITS DEMISE.

D. POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR/ PRC.

4. FOLLOWING ARE OUR INITIAL COMMENTS ON THESE MAJOR POINTS:

KOREAN QUESTION AT THE UN

5. AT THIS POINT, A DEBATE SEEMS INEVITABLE ALTHOUGH ITS PARAMETERS ARE UNCLEAR. WE ASSUME THAT NORTH WILL PARTICIPATE IN 28 TH UNGA DEBATE AND TRY THROUGH UNGA RESOLUTIONS TO HASTEN THE TERMINATION OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN QUESTION (PARTICULARLY UNCRUK AND UNC), AND TO CREATE PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES. IN DOING SO, IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME ALSO THAT NORTH AND ITS FRIENDS WILL ADDUCE NORTH'S " FIVE POINTS" WHICH CALL FOR REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, REDUCTION OF FORCES ON EACH KOREAN SIDE TO 200,000, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, AND A PEACE TREATY. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE NORTH'S POINTS WILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL APPEAL.

6. WE COULD THUS BE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UNC AND U. S. TROOP PRESENCE IS THE MAJOR, PERHAPS SOLE, FOCUS OF DEBATE. WE MUST WEIGH WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO USE THE NEW ROK POLICY FLEXIBILITY TO DEFLECT DEBATE INTO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANNELS. WE WILL NEED WASHINGTON AND USUN PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC WAYS TO HANDLE THE PROBABILITY OF DEBATE AT GA.

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7. MORE GENERALLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER MOST SERIOUSLY WHETHER OUR TACTICS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO EASING THE KOREAN QUESTION OUT OF THE UN CONTEXT WHILE ALLOWING THE TWO KOREAS TO ENTER. A " TWO KOREAS" POLICY ACCEPTED BY THE ROK AND ANY DUAL ADMISSION TO UNGA WOULD BRING TO AN END THE PRIVILEGED POSITION OF THE ROK INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE UN. IT MAY BE THAT OUR

MUTUAL INTEREST IS IN QUIETLY RECOGNIZING REALITY AND BRINGING TO AN END THE DIRECT UN RESPONSIBILITY FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION PROBLEM.

THE QUESTION OF THE UNC.

8. MOST COMPLEX PROBLEM WE FACE IS QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE UNC. AS NOTED ABOVE, WE WOULD EXPECT ALL- OUT ATTACK ON UNC AND US TROOP PRESENCE BY NORTH KOREANS. IF NORTH KOREA IS ADMITTED AS UN MEMMBER, IT IS DOUBTFUL WE CAN LONG MAINTAIN THE UNC, DESPITE ITS SECURITY COUNCIL ORIGIN. WHETHER OR NOT NORTH KOREA IS ADMITTED TO MEMBERSHIP, QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH UNC REMAINS.

9. ROKG DOES WICH TO MAINTAIN THE UNC UNBRELLA, IF AT ALL FEASIBLE. FURTHER, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION, UNC BASE RIGHTS IN JAPAN AND U. S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES ARE LINKED TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNC. THESE PRESENT THORNY PROBLEMS WHICH WE MUST ADDRESS. WHILE WE CANNOT MAKE DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENTS NOW, BELIEVE WE MUST BEGIN SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER FUTURE OF UNC AND POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OPTIONS.

THE HANDLING OF UNCURK
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10. NEITHER WE, THE ROKG NOR MOST OF THE UNCURK MEMBER GOVERNMENTS ARE OPPOSED TO THE ENDING OF UNCURK. THE PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY A TACTICAL ONE: HOW DO WE EFFECT THE COMMISSION'S DEMISE IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER NOT HARMFUL TO OURSELVES? A SECOND QUESTION IS WHETHER UNCURK HAS ANY VALUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP WITH THE OTHER SIDE. THESE QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT AND USUN VIEWS. OUR VIEW FROM HERE IS THAT UNCURK HAS ONLY MINOR VALUE BY ITSELF AS A BARGAINING
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COUNTER, BUT IT HAS OBVIOUS VALUE AS PART OF A LARGER NEGOTIATING PACKAGE.

POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR/ PRC

11. THE ROKG IS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITIES OF STRIKING SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT WITH RUSSIANS AND CHINESE ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND TWO KOREAS. IT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO OUR RAISING THESE MATTERS WITH THEM AS LONG AS IT IS DONE IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ROKG. IN FACT THEY WILL BE LOOKING TO US FOR OUR VIEWS ON HOW WE MIGHT APPROACH PRC AND SOVIETS ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW ROK POLICY.

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12. OBVIOUSLY ROKG WOULD LIKE SITUATION WHEREBY, AT COST OF SUSPENSION OF UNCURK, ADMISSION OF TWO KOREAS IN UN, AND "INTERNATIONAL" (I. E. ROK AND ITS ALLIES) ACCEPTANCE OF NORTH KOREA, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD AGREE TO DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF ROK, CONTINUATION OF UNC AND AVOIDANCE OF HARMFUL UN DEBATE. WHETHER ROK WOULD WISH TO GO FURTHER AND CONSIDER DISSOLUTION OF UNC IN SUCH A PACKAGE IS NOT CLEAR. WE SUSPECT ROKG WOULD CONSIDER THIS, BUT MOST READILY IN CONTEXT OF VERY CONCRETE RECIPROCAL GAINS, I. E., DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THEIR DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE OF CONTINUED U. S. TROOP PRESENCE.

13. IN ADDITION MAJOR POINTS LISTED ABOVE THERE FOLLOW SPECIFIC COMMENTS KEYED TO NUMBERED SECTIONS OF FONMIN'S GUIDELINES PAPER CONTAINED REFTEL:

(1) BASIC GUIDELINES

A. NO CHANGE IN GOALS OF REUNIFICATION, NO ROK RECOGNITION OF NORTH

THIS MATTER IS OBVIOUSLY MATTER FOR EACH STATE, INCLUDING ROK, TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF. WE UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF ROK PREFERENCE FOR NOT RECOGNIZING NORTH AS A SEPARATE STATE. WE SEE THIS AS A MATTER OF FORM, NOT AS AN OBSTACLE TO A DE FACTO "TWO KOREAS" POLICY.

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B. UN FORCES REMAIN

FONMIN HAS SAID THAT PRESENCE OF US FORCES IS ESSENTIAL WHILE THE CONTINUATION OF THE UNC IS " CONVENIENT." DECISIONS REGARDING UNC DEPEND IN PART ON CONTINUING ESTIMATES OF UNGA ATTITUDES AND VOTES. (EVEN THOUGH THIS IS MATTER FOR DECISION BY SECURITY COUNCIL, WE DO NOT WANT AN UNGA RESOLUTION OPPOSING CONTINUATION OF THE UNC). ALTERNATIVELY WE COULD ADOPT A BASIC POSITION THAT WITHDRAWL OF UNC/ US FORCES WOULD BE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF, AND FOLLOW, AMELIORATION OF THREAT WHICH BROUGHT THEM TO KOREA AND TO PROGRESS IN S- N TALKS. WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO ROK THAT (AS NOTED PARA 8 ABOVE) LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF ADMITTING TWO KOREAS TO UN IMPLIES END OF UNC WHICH WAS CREATED IN OPPOSITION TO NORTH KOREA. WITHOUT TAKING FIRM POSITION AT THIS TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS BEST FOR ROKG TO LEAVE THE QUESTION OPEN IN ANY INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS, UNTIL WE HAVE FULLY ASSESSED THE SITUATION.

C. MODUS VIVENDI TO BE INTERIM MEASURE PENDING UNIFICATION

WE SEE NO PROBLEM WITH THIS.

(2) ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH U. S.

A. NO ROK RECOGNITION OF NORTH
SEE PARA 13-1- A ABOVE.

B. UN FORCES STAY " AS LONG AS THREAT FROM NORTH EXISTS"

SEE PARA 13-1- B ABOVE. WE SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS ON THIS. IN PURSUIT OF ITS OWN POLICY INITIATIVE, ROKG UNDERSTANDABLY WANTS TO FREEZE US POLICY. WE CAN FINESSE THIS BY POINTING OUT THAT US FORCES ARE HERE UNDER MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, THAT WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THEM THERE WILL BE NO CHANGES IN FY74; AND THAT OUR BASIC POSIBITON ON FORCE LEVELS REMAINS THE SAME; WE WILL CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE ANY CHANGE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY ROK THAT IT HAS VETO OR CONTROL OVER US FORCE LEVELS OR MOVEMENTS.

C. (1) US WITHHOLD RECOGNITION OF NORTH UNTIL COMMUNIST POWERS RECOGNIZE SOUTH

WE CAN ASSURE ROKG THAT WE HAVE NO PLANS TO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA. WITHOUT GETTING COMMITTED INDEFINITELY TO THIS POSITION

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WE COULD ASSURE ROKG THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO USE THE RECOGNITION QUESTION AS LEVERAGE TO INDUCE COMMUNIST RECOGNITION OF SOUTH.

(2) US TO DISCOURAGE OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES FROM RECOGNIZING NORTH UNTIL, ETC.

WE SHOULD FRANKLY POINT OUT THAT THERE IS LITTLE WE OR ROKG CAN DO ON THIS SCORE TO HEAD OFF INCREASING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA. HOWEVER, WE COULD AGREE TO ASSIST

ROKG ON THIS POINT " IN APPROPRIATE WAYS" EMPHASIZING THAT ROKG SHOULD IN ALL INSTANCES TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ANY US EFFORTS WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF ROULDEMARCHES, NOT IN LIEU.

(3) US CONTACTS WITH NORTH ONLY TO EXTENT COMMUNIST COUNTRY HAS CONTACTS WITH SOUTH

WITHOUT MAKING INDEFINITE COMMITMENT, WE COULD AGREE FOR PRESENT TO AVOID OFFICIAL CONTACT BEYOND THAT GIVEN ROK BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, UNLESS THERE APPEAR TO BE OVERRIDING REASONS ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH ROKG AND US FOR DOING SO. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS ARE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY. USG HAS NO POWER TO PREVENT SUCH UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS AS VISITS OF HARRISON SALISBURY AND HEROME COHEN WHICH IN ANY EVENT WERE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SOUTH.

(4) US DISCOURAGE CONTACTS OF FRIENDLY POWERS WITH NORTH, ETC. AGAIN WE SHOULD BE REALISTIC IN POINTING OUT TO ROKG THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGING INCREASING CONTACTS BY FRIENDLY NATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. MERELY BY VIRTUE OF NORTH KOREA'S INCREASED DIPLOMATIC STANDING AND LIKELY PRESENCE IN UN AGENCIES THERE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN SUCH CONTACTS.

D. ROKG WILL NOT POSE OBJECTION TO THE PARTICIPATION OF NORTH KOREA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

WE SHOULD SUPPORT THIS ROK POLICY DECISION AS A REFLECTION OF CURRENT REALITIES. AT SAME TIME WE SHOULD EXPLORE MORE FULLY IMPLICATIONS AND CHANGES WHICH FLOW FROM IT. WE ASSUME THIS MEANS PRESIDENT PARK WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT ROKG HAS NO OBJECTIONS, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS DESIRABLE. WE ASSUME THAT WHETHER TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IS DECISION FOR EACH COUNTRY TO MAKE FOR ITSELF AND THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ROKG TO PROPOSE NK MEMBERSHIP.

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E. ROKG NOT SEEK DEFERMENT AT UN IN 28 TH UNGA OR OBJECT TO PARTICIPATION OF NORTH KOREA

WE SHOULD AGREE WITH THIS, AND FAVOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS POSIBITON BY PRESIDENT PARK. WE COULD SUGGEST THAT ROKG EVEN CONSIDER WELCMING PROSPECT OF NORTH KOREAN PARTICIPATION.

F. ROKG NOT OBJECT TO SUSPENSION OF UNCURK, ETC.

WE SHOULD AGREE. THE QUESTION IS, HOWEVER, WHETHER TO ANNOUNCE THIS PUBLICLY IN ADVANCE AND JUST WHAT TO SAY. AT THIS POINT WE FAVOR SOME FORM OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. THERE ARE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN DISPOSING OF UNCURK, BY SUSPENSION OR OTHERWISE, WHICH REQUIRE EXPERT ADVICE. AT A GIVEN POINT THE MATTER WOULD NEED DISCUSSION WITH UNCURK MEMBERS IN ADVANCE OF ANNOUNCEMENT.

14. IN VIEW FORTHRIGHT ROKG EFFORTS TO KEEP US INFORMED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY. IF WE DELAY UNDULY WE MAY FIND TIME SLIPPING AWAY FROM US AND ROKG POSITION FIRING UP WITHOUT OUR INPUTS. I RECOGNIZE THAT DEPARTMENT AND WASHINGTON AGENCIES CANNOT IMMEDIATELY ADDRESS ALL OF ISSUES DEFINITELY. I WOULD HOPE FOR FULLEST POSSIBLE GUIDANCE. HOWEVER, RECOMMEND THAT AT MINIMUM I BE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN INTIAL USG RESPONSE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. USG WELCOMES ROKG POLICY INITIATIVE AND IS APPRECIATIVE OF ROKG DESIRE FOR CLOSEST CONSULTATION.

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B. WE BELIVE, AS DOES ROKG, THAT IS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN OUR OLD POLICIES. SPECIFICALLY, WE CAN NEITHER HOPE TO BAR NORTH KOREA FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SECURE POSTPONEMENT OF UNGA DEBATE ON KOREAN QUESTION, NOR BLOCK NORTH KOREA' S PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A DEBATE.

C. CONSEQUENTLY, WE FULLY SUPPORT A ROK INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD ACCEPT NORTH KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WHICH RECOGNIZES THAT NEW POLICY TOWARD UN IS NECESSARY.

D. WE ALSO AGREE WITH ROKG VIEW ON CONSIDERATION OF ADMISSION OF TWO KOREAS TO UN WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT WE SHOULD STUDY THE POLICY RAMIFICATIONS WHICH THIS WILL ENTAIL.

E. QUESTIONS OF TACTS, TIMING AND CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES
MUST BE STUDIED CLOSELY AND IN CONCERT. WE ARE WORKING ON OUR
OWN VIEWS AND WILL BE DISCUSSING THEM WITH ROKG SHORTLY.

15. IN ADDITION REQUEST APPROVAL TO DISCUSS FONMIN' S GUIDELINES
PAPER ALONG LINES OF OUR COMMENTS CONTAINED PARA 13 ABOVE.
REQUEST THAT I RECEIVE INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS NLT JUNE 4 SO THAT
I MAY GET BACK TO FONMIN IN A TIMELY FASHION.
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